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SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
Smiths have represented in their brief that they did not 
become concerned with matters of indemnity/recovery of compensation 
until following settlement on January 9, 19861. David Cook 
testified that 99.9% of his time through settlement was on matters 
of defense. The record reflects the following facts: 
a. Smiths filed a trial brief on December 6, 19852 which 
contained arguments concerning indemnity. 
b. Smiths filed a supplemental trial brief on January 2, 
19863 which contained more arguments concerning indemnity. 
c. Smiths filed a post settlement memorandum concerning 
1Smiths' brief p. 41 
2Record on appeal pp. 322-346 
Record on appeal pp. 347-360 
indemnification4 which contained the same arguments previously 
asserted on December 6th and January 2, 1986 concerning indemnity * 
d. Cook spent 32 hours drafting the trial memoranda prior 
to settlement5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
Smiths and Western do not read this Court's prior decision the 
same way. However, the prior decision is the "law of the case" and 
must be followed. 
In a nutshell Western understood that this court decided that 
Smiths were entitled to be indemnified for the actual attorney's 
fees incurred in their defense as directors in a derivative action, 
but not for their personal time consumed in litigation. Secondly, 
the court held that Western should pay Smiths for work which they 
had done for the company and for which they had not been paid, but 
that Smiths would not be entitled to any attorney's fees for the 
collection of those sums. 
In granting Smiths judgment for a total of $35,432,96 Judge 
Conder ignored the law of this case. 
Smiths Point IV simply argues that this court's prior decision 
was in error. The time for making that argument expired with the 
time for seeking a Writ of Certiorari from the prior decision of 
Record on appeal pp. 347-360 
5Record on appeal p. 315, D-61; Record on appeal 




Smiths' brief takes Western to task for failing to marshall 
evidence supporting the judgment. Smiths seem to argue that the 
lower courts findings of fact constitute evidence. If that were 
the case one could never challenge findings as being unsupported 
by evidence. Western in fact annexed to its brief the entire text 
of the evidence Judge Conder admittedly used in making his findings 
and Western continues to believe that it is insufficient to support 
the judgment rendered. 
Ill 
Smiths prepared the majority of the financial documents 
presented at trial. They did so during the regular course of being 
the accountants for Western. Smiths were paid for the preparation 
of those documents. Smiths convinced the lower court that they 
were unpaid for such work and thus attempted to justify as CPA time 
that which in reality was litigant time. However, the time 
summaries from which the trial judge made his award clearly show 
that Smiths were seeking compensation for their time simply being 
litigants. 
IV 
Smiths Point V argues that Smiths are entitled to recover 
under quasi contract even if they were not entitled to recover 
under indemnity. Smiths did not argue for equitable recovery below 
and the lower court did not grant judgment based on equity, but 
rather granted indemnity at Smiths urging. To quote Smiths' brief 
3 
"Issues, defenses and factual claims not presented at trial cannot 
be considered on appeal."6 
V 
Smiths Points VI & VII argue that the awards of attorney's 
fees are supported by ample evidence which Western failed to 
marshall in support of the lower court's judgment. In support of 
this argument Smiths attempt to mislead this court by stating that 
no research was done on the indemnification issues until after the 
case was settled between the other parties. Smiths' trial 
memorandum was filed prior to trial and over a month before the 
case settled. It clearly raises the issue of indemnity. 
VI 
Smiths argue that prejudgment interest was properly awarded 
by the lower court. Western concedes that the law in Utah is to 
allow interest on overdue debts7. However, Western does not 
concede that the debt due Smiths was overdue until the lower court 
entered its judgment. After all this court did reverse the lower 
court's original judgment and Western had no way to pay the amount 
owed even under protest. Suppose Western had paid the judgment 
under protest while preserving its right to appeal rather than 
posting cash in lieu of supersedeas. Under the lower court's 
rationale it would have still owed additional interest because the 
judgment after remand is greater than the original judgment. 
6Smiths' Brief p. 18 {citations omitted} 
7Vali Convalescent v. Div. of Health Care Financing, 797 P. 2d 
438 (Utah Ct.of App. 1990) 
4 
In the case at hand both parties have been denied the 
beneficial use of the original judgment amount by virtue of the 
deposit in lieu of supersedeas. Clearly that deposit has drawn 
interest, but not at the rate of 10%. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN THE PRIOR APPEAL OF THIS 
MATTER CONSTITUTES THE LAW OF THE CASE AND THE MAJORITY 
OF SMITH ARGUMENTS ON THIS APPEAL IGNORE THAT DOCTRINE. 
This Court's prior decision8 is the "law of the case"9. 
Smith's fail to cite, or even mention, it. "There are sound policy 
considerations supporting the "law of the case doctrine and the 
principle that a court should not reconsider and overrule a 
decision made by a coequal court. Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & 
Oil, Inc., 692 P.2D 735, 736 (Utah 1984). As Justice Zimmerman 
states: 
One branch of what is generally termed the doctrine of 
"law of the Case has evolved to avoid the delays and 
difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with 
an issue identical to one which has already been passed 
upon by a coordinate judge in the same case. 
"[0]rdinarily one judge of the same court cannot properly 
overrule the decision of another judge of that court." 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397. 
Id. at 736. Cf. Daly v. Sprague, 742 F.2d 896, 900 (5th 
Cir. 1984) ("While the 'law of the case' doctrine is not 
^Goodrich, et al. v. Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc., et al.,f 
Case No. 860370-CA 
9
 Conder v. k.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 636 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Linam v. King, 804 P. 2d 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) 
5 
an inexorable command, a decision of a legal issue or 
issues by an appellate court establishes the 'law of the 
case' and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings 
in the same case . . . unless . . . the decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." 
Smith's first point on this appeal is the same as its first 
point on the first appeal* And this court has previously ruled 
that "Western did not waive its right to challenge the 
reasonableness of the awards made by the trial court,..."11. 
Smith's argument of waiver and estoppel were previously 
presented in the prior appeal and dealt with therein. Western has 
argued the Smith's are not entitled to indemnity for their time. 
This court agreed on the prior appeal and the issue should have 
been closed. 
Smiths Points III & IV argue that this Court's prior decision 
was in error to the extent that it holds that litigant time is not 
an indemnifiable expense under the statute12. In the lower court 
Smiths argued that this courts decision was unclear and missed the 
point. 
The lower court's ruling that adopts Smith's characterization 
of all of the time consumed by the litigation as being an expense 
for which indemnification is appropriate seems to Western to have 
overruled this court's prior decision. 
Conder, Supra 
11Amended Memorandum Opinion p.2, Filed May 9, 1988; Record on 
appeal p.1307 
12Utah Code Ann., § 16-10-4(o) (1953) 
6 
Western did in fact present to the trial Court an offer of 
judgment in which it set forth a recapitulation of the services 
for which it believed Smith's were entitled to additional 
compensation on a theory of Quantum Valum or Quantum Meruit; 
however, Western has been consistent in its view that none of 
Smith's time can be considered an expense for which indemnification 
is appropriate. 
Western can hardly be said to be estopped from raising the 
very issues which this Court has suggested in its opinion ought to 
be resolved on remand. 
The statement in Western's brief that this Court should 
reverse the judgment in favor of Smiths and award them nothing 
refers to the judgment in favor of Smith's for the value of their 
time consumed in litigation as an indemnifiable expense. Western 
believes that the judgment granted by the lower court for the 
time/value of Smiths time as an indemnifiable expense must be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
WESTERN DID MARSHALL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE 
LOWER COURT MADE ITS DETERMINATION AND DID NOT IGNORE THE 
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT. 
Western appended to its brief the entire time summaries 
together with Judge Conder's handwritten deletions struck out as 
addendums B & C. Based upon the time summaries, Judge Conder 
calculated the number of hours of Smiths time consumed by 
litigation and multiplied that number by $35.00. If there exists 
other evidence to support the judgment in favor of Smith's, Western 
7 
is truly unaware of what it might be13. The dispute here is more 
a question of law than of fact in any event. 
Western is unable to further marshall the evidence because it 
appears to Western that the fundamental concept upon which the 
judgment is based is flawed. The fallacy of the judgment is that 
it interprets Utah Code Ann., § 16-10-4(o)(3) (1953) to require 
that a director is entitled to be compensated for time spent 
litigating as if it were an out-of-pocket expense. 
In the court below Smiths argued that the prior decision of 
the Court of Appeals in this case did not rule on the question of 
whether time consumed in litigation would be treated as an 
indemnifiable expense14. They further argued that the correct 
interpretation of the statute would allow time consumed in 
litigation to be indemnified as an out-of-pocket expense. 
On remand Smiths thus presented the evidence of all of their 
time consumed in litigation without regard to whether it had value 
to Western relying on the argument that time consumed in litigation 
was an out-of-pocket expense. Smiths convinced the lower court, 
prepared and submitted the findings, conclusions and judgment. 
Western duly objected to same and, incredibly, only upon arguing 
Western's objections did counsel for Smiths realize that this Court 
had actually reversed the prior judgment. Not surprisingly the 
13Judge Conder himself stated "The Smiths have each submitted 
expanded time sheets with detailed explanations of the time spent. 
A copy is attached to the Answers to Interrogatories submitted by 
each of them. It is these schedules that this court has used in 
arriving at it decision." Record on appeal p.1516 
Record on appeal p.1756 
8 
facts simply will not support the judgment. 
Western argued that the prior Court of Appeals ruling was that 
Smiths would not be entitled to indemnity for their time under any 
conditions and that any recovery would have to be based on an 
unjust enrichment or quasi contract theory. 
"We assume their services to Western as certified public 
accountants are recoverable whereas their time spent on activities 
which any named defendant in a lawsuit encounters, such as sitting 
around the courthouse awaiting developments, is not recoverable.'*15 
Western understood the Court's statement to mean that Smiths could 
recover for their services to Western as CPAs based upon the 
demonstrated value to Western of that service, but not as 
indemnity. 
Had Smiths hired outside accountants, and paid them, then 
Smiths could have recovered the fees paid the outside accountants 
as indemnity. If Western had hired outside accountants, then 
Western, not Smiths, would be obligated to pay the outside 
accountants. But either way Smiths would not be entitled to 
recover the value of Smiths time spent supervising those 
accountants. Thus, Smiths would not be entitled to indemnification 
for the value of their time consumed in litigation. 
Judge Conder concluded as a matter of law that Smith was 
entitled to judgment against Western "for indemnification for his 
professional C.P.A. time/expense..."16 In so doing Judge Conder 
5Record on appeal p. 1308 
6Record on appeal p. 1627 
9 
adopted the view Smiths proposed. Western understood the previous 
decision of this Court to hold that the value Smith's time cannot 
be recovered as indemnification. 
POINT III 
SMITHS CHARACTERIZE THEIR TIME CONSUMED IN LITIGATION AS 
BEING VALUABLE DEFENSE SERVICES; HOWEVER, THE TIME 
SUMMARIES FROM WHICH THE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED FAIL TO 
SUPPORT THE CLAIM OF VALUE TO WESTERN. 
Smiths made much of the fact that virtually all of the 
financial evidence presented at trial was originally prepared by 
them. Western concedes the point. In the 25th Finding of Fact17, 
prepared by Smith's attorney and signed by Judge Conder, Smiths 
have listed approximately 40 exhibits which were originally 
prepared by them. Smiths did not mention that the majority of 
exhibits listed consisted of old tax returns, balance sheets, 
checks, W-2 Forms and other accounting information which had been 
prepared for Western long prior to trial and had been previously 
paid for on the regular monthly billings. 
Smiths make it sound like they had to go to a great deal of 
additional accounting type work in order to participate in the 
trial of the above matter. That simply is not the case. What they 
had to do was to photocopy old data which they had previously 
prepared. 
Although the Plaintiffs settled, it is clear from the record 
that it was Willard Smiths inability to compare the number of 
issued shares with the capital account of the corporation which 
Record on appeal p. 1610 
10 
gave rise to the lawsuit in the first place. 
Smiths chose to meet their burden of proof by summarizing all 
of their time spent in conjunction with this litigation without 
respect to whether the time was of any benefit to Western. For 
example, it was never explained how Western benefitted from having 
either, let alone both, Keith and Willard Smith attend the 
depositions of W.W. Bowerbank and Blaine Goodrich. Western had 
hired an attorney with excellent credentials who attended on behalf 
of the corporation. 
In addition they created a recap of all of the work they had 
done for Western in which they calculated that the effective rate 
they had been charging Western for work done by them personally was 
$34.76/hour & $34.39/hour. The agreed rate was $13-14.00/hour. 
Thus, the evidence before the lower court was rather like a 
mixed metaphor. The court was presented with a long standing 
agreement to pay Smiths by the hour for their accounting time. 
And, also with the opinion of this court which indicates that 
Western should pay for the benefits it receives. Smiths did not 
present evidence of value to the corporation of the services 
rendered even though that was clearly a predicate to recovery. 
The value to Smiths of their time was $35.00/hour (prox.) with 
respect to Western. Once the lower court was convinced that the 
law required indemnification to the Smiths for the value of their 
time, the court concluded its award should be the value of the time 
to the Smiths, rather than the value to Western ($13-14.00/hr). 
11 
POINT IV 
SMITHS CHOSE NOT TO ARGUE FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER A 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST OR QUASI CONTRACT IN THE LOWER COURT, 
BUT RATHER ELECTED INDEMNIFICATION. 
Smiths chose not to pursue the equitable remedies before the 
lower court, but rather they chose to pursue statutory indemnity. 
They should be estopped from pursuing them now in this court. 
Smiths' "Point V" argues the Smiths services equally benefited 
Western and "should be paid for by Western in all events". As a 
basis for this conclusion Smiths propose two reasons, (1) Smiths 
filled Western's defense needs as expert accounting witnesses 
{quasi contract}; (2) Smiths were trustees; and, (3) quasi 
contract. 
None of these theories were advanced to the court below and 
clearly Judge Conder did not grant such a judgment. Smiths did not 
appeal from the lack of such a judgment, but rather from the 
failure of the lower court to grant them further attorney's fees. 
In response Western submits: 
(1) No party to this case used the services of any expert 
witnesses whatsoever. Plaintiffs had requested that an accounting 
be done, however, that issue was yet to be tried and the case was 
resolved without an accounting being ordered. None of the witness 
lists reflect any expert witnesses on accounting and in point of 
fact few, if any, of the issues to be tried in the pretrial order 
lend themselves to expert accounting testimony. 
(2) Smiths claim they were de facto trustees for both 
Plaintiffs and Bowerbank. Western is unaware of such a trust and 
12 
in all events the argument was never raised before the trial court 
and should not be allowed on appeal where neither Plaintiffs nor 
Bowerbank are parties. 
(3) Smiths did not present or argue for recovery under quasi 
contract in the lower court and should not be allowed to raise the 
issue here for the reasons set forth in POINT III above. Moreover, 
the evidence of value, as Smiths recognize in their brief would 
have been value to Western, not loss of value to Smiths. No such 
evidence was ever presented. 
POINT V 
SMITHS .ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF INDEMNITY 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 
BUT FAIL TO POINT THE EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS THE AWARD. 
Smiths were sued by Plaintiffs, the lower court found the 
plaintiffs not to have acted in bad faith and awarded none of 
Smiths attorney's fees against the plaintiffs18. Because Plaintiffs 
made derivative claims against Smiths, they are entitled to 
indemnity for attorney's fees necessarily incurred in defense from 
Western even though Western made no direct claim against Smiths. 
Western is obligated to indemnify only the defense portion of 
Smiths' $18,081.25 attorney's fee bill actually incurred. Thus, 
the real question is when did the defense end and collecting fees 
begin. 
Western is unable to marshall any evidence to support the 
award for the reason that the trial court was forced to speculate. 
^emo opinion, Oct. 5, 1989 Record on appeal p.1516 
13 
Western believes the evidence supports the following: 
1. Cook's agreed rate of compensation through the 
pretrial was $75.00/hr. 
2. Cook spent 71.75 hours through the time of pretrial. 
3. Cook's agreed fee through the time of the pretrial 
was $5,381.25. 
4. At some point following the pretrial Cook raised his 
fees to $100/hr. 
5. From the pretrial to the conclusion of the 
settlement by Plaintiffs Cook spent an additional 127 
hours of professional time. 
6. Cook's agreed fee from the time of the pretrial 
through settlement was no more than $12,700.00. 
7. Smiths were obligated to pay Cook only $18,081.25 
for all services rendered through settlement. 
There exists no evidentiary basis for conclusions beyond the above. 
Because of Smiths failure to present sufficient evidence the trial 
court was simply forced to speculate. 
The trial court found that Smiths should be awarded $100/hour 
for their attorney's fees19 for the entire 198.75 hours the trial 
court found were spent on defense. The trial court based its 
ruling on the premise that $100/hour was a reasonable attorney's 
fee and that 198.75 hours were spent. Thus Smiths actually owed 
Cook $18,081.25 for all of his services through settlement, but 
Smiths were awarded judgment for $19,875.00. 
The trial court did not reduce by a single minute Cook's time 
spent on matters of "recovery of compensation" even though Cook 
himself testified that he had spent time trying to obtain recovery 
Record on appeal p. 1623 
14 
for the Smiths for their time consumed in litigation as well as on 
defense all through the litigation. Cook also testified that 
Smiths were no longer defendants in a derivative action after the 
pretrial conference20 and that they refused to allow themselves to 
be dismissed out of the action21. 
Smiths' brief, page 41, states that "the first research on 
indemnification issues...was started late on the day of the mid-
trial settlement - January 9,1986. (R. 461)". The clear 
implication is that no substantial work was done by Cook to recover 
the value of Smiths time until after the settlement. 
The statement is patently false. Smiths filed a 25 page 
"trial memorandum"22 which is an excellent example of the proportion 
of time spent on indemnity (for time). Exhibit D-61 (trial) 
reflects that Cook spent 19.75 of a total to that point of 81.5 
hours drafting that trial memorandum24. Western views that 
memorandum as being at least 20% aimed at recovering compensation 
for the Smiths25 and none of it as defending them against any 
monetary issue aimed at Willard or Keith Smith. 
While Smiths are able to suggest some clever explanations why 
Record on appeal p.1891; Transcript 9-13-89, p. 135 
21Record on appeal p.1893; Transcript 9-13-89 p. 137 
22Record on appeal pp. 322-346 
23Record on appeal p. 315; pp.456 at 468 
Record on appeal p.456 at 468 
25ROA p.342 "Officer/Directors Willard L. Smith and Keith C. 
Smith are entitled to be reimbursed for their time and expenses of 
this litigation..." 
15 
Judge Conder awarded them 110% of the attorney's fees they 
incurred, clearly the lower court did not make such findings. 
Smiths had the burden of proof, yet when asked when the rate 
had changed they simply refused to give the lower court any 
guidance. No one could say when the rate had changed. In addition 
as Smiths admit in their brief they were unable to differentiate 
between how much of their attorney's time was consumed on matters 
of indemnity and how much was consumed concerning compensation for 
the Smiths (Smiths' Brief p. 40). And thus Smiths claim they 
should be entitled to all of their attorney's fees. 
The trial court refused to allow any time following the first 
appeal. Smiths have appealed from that denial. Smiths do not 
suggest what the award of fees should have been although Mr. Cook 
suggested on his own testimony that he had split his time post 
settlement 80/20 (CPA Time/Att'y fees)26. 
Smiths prepared proposed findings of fact for Judge Conder and 
the judge simply denied the requested proposed findings and crossed 
them out. Smiths did not brief, nor is there any factual basis for 
any award of post settlement attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should award Smiths judgment in the amount of 
$5,381.25 as indemnification for their reasonable attorney's fees 
actually and necessarily incurred in defense of them as directors 
of Western through the pretrial conference and order issued 
thereon; $252.07 as indemnification for their costs incurred in 
'Record on appeal p. 1884; Transcript 9-13-89, p. 128 
16 
defense; and interest thereon at the rate of 10% from the 2nd day 
of December 1985. Further, this Court should order the return to 
defendant Western Auto Radiator its deposit in lieu of supersedeas 
which is in excess of the judgment of this Court. 
DATED this IP "" day of June, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S A. M c I N T Y R E f 
17 
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